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ABSTRACT
Juvenile Solitary Confinement and the Eighth Amendment
Taylor Graves
Director: Professor Sandy McKeown, J.D.

This literature review examines the practice of juvenile solitary confinement,
applies the United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, argues that
the practice should be declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment,
and calls for a categorical ban. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment states, “nor [shall] cruel and unusual punishments [be] inflicted.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. Juvenile solitary confinement is cruel and unusual, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, because juveniles are different. The United States Supreme Court
has long recognized that juveniles should not be held to the same standards of
accountability or degrees of punishment as adults. Additionally, the practice of juvenile
solitary confinement itself is different and, consequently, cruel and unusual. Solitary
confinement imposes severe psychological, physical, social, and developmental harm.
When imposed on juveniles, these effects are conceivably permanent. An application of
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to juveniles’ solitary confinement clearly illustrates
that the Supreme Court should declare the practice unconstitutional as a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Therefore, following Supreme Court precedent, a categorical ban
against juvenile solitary confinement is the appropriate remedy for this constitutional
violation.

KEYWORDS: juvenile, solitary confinement, eighth amendment, cruel, unusual,
punishment
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Historical Analysis of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”1 In the case of Robinson v. California, this amendment was made applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,2 which prohibits states from making or
enforcing, “any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States,” and from depriving, “any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”3
The inclusion of the Eighth Amendment received little debate in Congress during
the constitutional conventions of 1776.4 George Mason, a delegate of the Virginia
Constitutional Convention, proposed a Bill of Rights on June 12, which included the
modern day Eighth Amendment.5 Following the inclusion of this amendment in the
Virginia State Constitution, eight other states adopted it into their constitutions, the
Federal Government included it in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and it finally
became the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution in 1791.6 Although
there was little debate over this constitutional amendment, the vague language led to
difficulty in its interpretation. The Framers were primarily concerned with the infliction

1

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
3
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
4
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
5
Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 Calif.
L. Rev. 839, 840 (1969).
6
Id.
2

1

of torture and other barbarous methods of punishment when they incorporated the Eighth
Amendment.7 This initial view, and the vague language of the amendment itself, led to an
evolving interpretation of the clause in United States courts over time.

Judicial Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
The first courts interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause by
considering if a punishment or a similar variant of a punishment had been considered
cruel and unusual in 1789, when the United States Constitution was put into effect.8
However, in 1910, in Weems v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a previously acceptable punishment, in itself, was cruel and unusual.9
In that case, Weems was convicted of falsifying a public document by entering, as paid
out, the amounts of 208 and 408 pesos as wages to certain employees of the Light House
Service.10 Guided by the Penal Code of Spain, Weems was sentenced to cadena
temporal, and a fine ranging from 1,250 to 12,500 pesetas.11 The Court examined and
gave a graphic description of the minimum possible sentence that could be imposed on
Weems for this crime.12 The minimum punishment that could come from this conviction
included
confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and one day, a chain at
the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance

7

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976).
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS, Cornell Law School § 2,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-8/cruel-and-unusual-punishments (last visited
June 24, 2021).
9
Weems, 217 U.S. 349 at 362.
10
Id. at 363.
11
Id. at 363-364.
12
Id. at 366.
8
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from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of
property, no participation even in the family council.13
The Court noted that this punishment would limit one’s liberty even after the prison bars
and chains had been removed.14 Additionally, it noted that no circumstance of
degradation or cruelty of pain is omitted.15 Thus, the Court held that the punishment was
cruel in its excess of imprisonment and in the penalties that accompany and follow
imprisonment.16 It also held that the punishment was unusual in its character.17
Although this punishment was previously deemed acceptable for this crime, and
was outlined in the Penal Code of Spain, the Court found that the punishment violated the
Eighth Amendment.18 It stated, “Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which it gave birth.”19 The Court argued that the judiciary
must interpret the law to fit new situations, as the Framers of the United States
Constitution could not possibly imagine every circumstance that would arise.20
In 1958, in the case of Trop v. Dulles, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the forfeiture of citizenship for the crime of wartime desertion
violated the Eighth Amendment.21 Although the punishment in question did not involve
physical mistreatment or primitive torture, the Court stated that denationalization is “the

13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 377.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 382.
19
Id. at 373.
20
Id.
21
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87 (1958).
14
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total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.”22 This punishment, the
Court stated, is offensive to constitutional principles because it subjects the individual to
a future of increasing fear and distress.23 The threat of discriminations that may be
established against him, proscriptions that may be directed against him, and termination
of existence in his native land makes the punishment obnoxious, the Court added.24 Thus,
it held that the punishment of denaturalization for the crime of wartime desertion violated
the Eighth Amendment.25
In its reasoning, the Court stated that “the basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”26 It explained that it is the duty of
the judiciary to defend the Constitution and to implement the constitutional safeguards
that protect individual rights.27 It also stated, reaffirming the holding of Weems, that the
provisions of the Constitution “are vital, living principles that authorize and limit
governmental powers in our Nation.”28 Rephrasing the Weems holding, the Trop Court
added that “the Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”29 This phrasing and interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has followed courts
into modern cases.
Weems and Trop were significant cases that changed the way courts interpreted
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Instead of simply

22

Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 104.
26
Id. at 100.
27
Id. at 103.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 100.
23
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considering whether the punishment had been considered cruel and unusual at the time
the Constitution was ratified, courts began to consider whether the punishment itself was
cruel and unusual in light of an ever-changing society. As the values of society change,
courts now make decisions in accordance with those values, and apply the Constitution to
issues based on the evolving standards of decency. These two cases expanded the scope
of the Eighth Amendment, provided the judiciary with more discretion in its
consideration of Eighth Amendment issues, and, therefore, provided individuals with a
greater protection of their constitutional right.
A demonstration of the impact of these two cases on the protections provided by
the Eighth Amendment can be found in case law considering the death penalty. In 1988,
in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibited the execution of a person who was under the age of sixteen at the time of his
or her offense.30 One year later, in Penry v. Lynaugh, it held that the Eighth Amendment
did not categorically ban the execution of an offender with a mental disability simply by
virtue of his or her disability alone.31 On that same day, the Court decided Stanford v.
Kentucky and held that the imposition of capital punishment on an individual for a crime
committed at sixteen or seventeen years of age did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.32
Thirteen years later, in 2002, the Court reconsidered the Penry holding.33 After
applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of the evolving standards of decency, it held
that the punishment was excessive and that the Constitution restricts the State’s power to

30

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
32
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
33
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
31

5

take the life of an offender with a mental disability.34 Finally, in 2005, the Court
reconsidered the holding of Stanford and held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the
age of eighteen when their crimes were committed.35
As this area of case law illustrates, Weems and Trop were extremely significant
cases in expanding the scope of the rights provided by the Eighth Amendment. As time
has passed, the Court has construed and applied the amendment to align with the
maturing society. It has greatly expanded the protections provided by the Eighth
Amendment through many cases over time by considering issues in light of the evolving
standards of decency.

34
35

Id. at 321.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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CHAPTER 2
JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT

Historical Analysis of Juvenile Justice
The conceptions of childhood have greatly evolved over time, leading to the
modern view of juveniles. Before the sixteenth century, children’s development was
ignored and children were not viewed as potential members of society due to high rates
of infant mortality that discouraged parents from becoming emotionally attached to their
children.36 By the sixteenth century, with a decline in infant mortality rates, a rise in
Christianity, and increased literacy rates, children began to be recognized as individuals
who may come of age to participate in familial and societal affairs.37 In the seventeenth
century, children and adolescents were viewed as malleable beings who needed to be
shaped into law-abiding, God-fearing adults through education and other interventions.38
This evolving view of children and adolescents was one of the factors that informed the
creation of separate systems to manage juveniles.39
The legal system the American colonists brought from England treated juvenile
offenders as adults, and any child over the age of seven was potentially accountable for
criminal acts they had committed.40 In the early 1800s, concerns began to arise about the
treatment of juveniles in the adult criminal justice system, and institutions to confine

36

Geoff K. Ward, The Black Child-Savers: Racial Democracy & Juvenile Justice, 20 (2012).
Id.
38
Id. at 20-21.
39
It is worth noting that this concept of childhood evolution has been largely based upon writings by
Philippe Ariès. His works were not uncontroversial, and he has been criticized for his reliance upon printed
and pictorial evidence, his chronological vagueness, his present-minded point of view, and his findings
being unexplained and unrelated to other historical themes. Adrian Wilson, The Infancy of the History of
Childhood: An Appraisal of Philippe Ariès, 19 History and Theory 132, 135-136 (1980).
40
Robert W. Taylor & Eric J. Fritsch, Juvenile Justice: Policies, Programs, and Practices, 22 (5th ed.
2020).
37
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juvenile offenders separately from adults were established.41 This eventually led to the
foundation of the first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois in 1899.42
The juvenile justice system was founded on the doctrine of parens patriae,
translated to “state as parent.”43 The parens patriae power is a plenary state power
consisting of two principles.44 The first principle provides that the state holds an inherent
authority to intervene in a child’s life when it believes it is appropriate to do so.45 This
power originates from English common-law principles that established the King as
parens patriae over infants, and the concept dates back to at least the seventeenth
century.46 In that time, the King was the “general guardian of all infants, idiots, and
lunatics,” and by virtue of the privilege which belonged to the Crown as parens patriae,
English courts of chancery claimed jurisdiction over matters involving children who were
in need of protection.47
The second principle of the parens patriae power provides that once the state
steps in, it should act as a super-parent of the child.48 This principle has the same English
common-law roots as the first.49 In that time, the state, in its parens patriae role, was
presumed and intended to be gentle, nonpunitive, and therapeutic, while state actors in
the juvenile court system were viewed as parent surrogates providing caring discipline

41

Id. at 4.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Esther K. Hong, ARTICLE: A REEXAMINATION OF THE PARENS PATRIAE POWER, 88 Tenn. L.
Rev. 277, 283 (2021).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 284.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 287.
49
Id.
42
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and treatment.50 The state was to act in the child’s best interests, and the primary goal
was rehabilitation.51
The first juvenile courts were certainly concerned with a broader range of conduct
than acts that would be considered criminal if committed by adults.52 They exercised
jurisdiction over cases of neglect and dependency, and thus handled cases involving
improper nutrition, school attendance, and more. The focus on rehabilitation transpired
from “a conception of criminal conduct as a symptom of an underlying condition that
required treatment, rather than as bad conduct warranting punishment.”53 In juveniles,
this underlying condition was caused by poor parental guidance and social harms
associated with poverty.54 This emerging juvenile justice system was an inquisitorial
system whose purpose was to determine the cause of juvenile delinquency, diagnose
illness, and prescribe treatment to the juvenile.55
Critics of the early juvenile justice system argued that the system was ineffective
in dealing with the issues of violent crime and repeat offenders.56 This resulted in a wave
of “get tough on crime” legislation that began in the 1970s.57 By the late 1970s, the goals
of juvenile justice legislation had shifted from rehabilitation to punishment, justice,
accountability, and public protection.58 This system assumed that juveniles rationally
chose to commit delinquent acts, so the reason a juvenile engaged in delinquency was

50

Id.
Id.
52
Chase S. Burton, REVIEW ESSAY: Child Savers and Unlike Youth, 44 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1251, 1255
(2019).
53
Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on
Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J Crim L & Criminology 137, 141 (2001).
54
Id. at 142.
55
Taylor, supra note 40, at 28.
56
Id. at 32.
57
Id.
58
Id.
51
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secondary to the offense the juvenile actually committed.59 This shift in the way the
juvenile justice system viewed and dealt with juvenile offenders gave rise to a new
approach to juvenile law.
In the mid-2000s, nonprofit agencies and advocates funded scientific research that
prompted a developmental approach in juvenile justice which, in turn, advanced reforms
based on neuroscience and developmental science concerning youths’ lessened
culpability.60 These scientific developments led to several landmark Supreme Court
decisions that implemented this new outlook.61 From this approach, courts took the
developmental differences in juveniles into consideration for constitutional doctrinal
purposes.62 These decisions caused many jurisdictions to pull back from punitive aims
and return to a more rehabilitative-focused approach to juvenile justice.63 These landmark
decisions led to exceptional advances in juvenile justice jurisprudence and a wave of
litigation, scholarship, and other advocacy efforts centered around the developmental
approach.64

Juveniles are Different Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that juveniles should not be
held to the same standards of accountability or degrees of punishment as adults.65 In the
1988 Supreme Court case, Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court stated that there are

59

Id. at 36.
Hong, supra note 44, at 293-294.
61
Id. at 291-292.
62
Id. at 292.
63
Id. at 293.
64
Id.
65
Nicole Johnson, Solitary Confinement of Juvenile Offenders and Pre-Trial Detainees, 35 Touro L. Rev.
699, 699 (2019).
60
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differences which must be accommodated when determining the rights and duties of
children compared with those of adults.66 It listed several examples demonstrating the
legal distinction between children and adults including contracts, torts, criminal law and
procedure, criminal sanctions, rehabilitation, the right to vote, and the right to hold
office.67 The Court stated that the reason why juveniles are not trusted with the same
privileges and responsibilities explains why their irresponsible conduct is not as
blameworthy as that of an adult.68 It also acknowledged that juvenile crime is not
exclusively the fault of the offender, but it instead represents a failure of family, school,
and the social system, all of which share responsibility for the development of youth.69
In 2005, in the case of Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court described three
general differences between juveniles and adults.70 First, the Court stated that juveniles
have “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” which often
results “in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”71 Second, it stated that
“juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures.”72 This is explained, the Court stated, by juveniles having less control over
their own environment.73 The third difference it identified is the character of a juvenile
not being as well formed as that of an adult.74 It explained that a juvenile’s personality
traits are less fixed.75 The Court held that “the susceptibility of juveniles to immature and

66

Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 at 823.
Id.
68
Id. at 835.
69
Id. at 834.
70
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 at 569.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 570.
75
Id.
67
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irresponsible behavior means that their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.”76
In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court stated that no recent data had
provided reason to reconsider the observations made in Roper about the nature of
juveniles.77 It instead found that developments in psychology and brain science continued
to show fundamental differences between the minds of juveniles and adults.78 According
to neuroscience research, one of the most significant differences between juvenile and
adult brains relates to the prefrontal cortex.79 One area of the prefrontal cortex in
particular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex portion of the frontal lobe, is one of the last
regions of the brain to reach maturity, and this does not occur until at least age twenty.80
The prefrontal cortex plays a critical role in high-level mental processing, “such as
strategizing, planning, and organizing actions and thoughts.”81 This part of the brain also
controls impulses and allows one to prioritize and weigh the consequences of decisions.82
Psychosocial factors, when combined with these cognitive differences, leaves juveniles
with “decision-making skills and abilities that are defined by immaturity, impulsivity,
and an under-developed ability to appreciate consequences and resist environmental
pressures.”83

76

Id.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
78
Id.
79
Ian M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary: Litigating an End to the Solitary Confinement of Children in Jails and
Prisons, 40 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 675, 687 (2016).
80
Id. at 688.
81
Id. at 687-688.
82
Id. at 688.
83
Tamar R. Birckhead, Children in Isolation: The Solitary Confinement of Youth, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev.
1, 10 (2015).
77
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As illustrated in Thompson, Roper, and Graham, juveniles are different from
adults. Developments in psychology and brain science have shown that juveniles are
different in terms of psychosocial factors and cognitive differences. The fact that
juveniles are not trusted with the same privileges and responsibilities as adults is further
confirmation of the differences between the two. When considering the imposition of
solitary confinement on juveniles, it is important to keep in mind that this group is
already psychologically compromised when compared to adults.84

84

Id. at 13.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PUNISHMENT IS DIFFERENT

Historical Analysis of Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement has been used in penal institutions in the United States since
the 1800s.85 The first solitary confinement cell blocks were authorized by the
Pennsylvania legislature in 1790 to house the most dangerous offenders.86 This
innovation took place under the influence of a group largely populated by Quakers who
believed in punishment for crimes, but also believed that all people were capable of
redemption.87 Solitary confinement was originally intended to force the prisoner to reflect
upon his crime, read the Bible, and repent.88 However, when prison officials began to see
prisoners mentally deteriorating after being placed in isolation, the practice was largely
discontinued.89 With the exception of Pennsylvania, every other state that had
implemented solitary confinement into their penal institutions between 1830 and 1880
abandoned the practice within a few years.90
In 1983 at the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, however, a week of
inmate rioting occurred, leaving two officers dead.91 Marion went into a prolonged
emergency lockdown, and the use of solitary confinement was revived.92 Nearly every
prison and jail in the United States developed a solitary confinement unit of some kind

85

Johnson, supra note 65, at 704.
Lauren M. Coler, Isolated and Forgotten: End the Use and Practice of Solitary Confinement in the
Juvenile Justice System, 45 T. Marshall L. Rev. 93, 99 (2021).
87
Jean Casella et al., Hell is a Very Small Place, 3 (2016).
88
Johnson, supra note 65 at 704.
89
Lindley A. Bassett, The Constitutionality of Solitary Confinement: Insights from Maslow’s Hierarchy of
Needs, 26 Health Matrix 403, 407 (2016).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
86
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and from 1995 to 2000, the number of individuals held in solitary confinement increased
by 40%.93

Solitary Confinement in Practice
Although solitary confinement use varies by facility, a 2016 juvenile residential
facility census report found that 46 percent of facilities confine juveniles at least some of
the time.94 Solitary confinement is the practice of isolating people in closed cells for 22 to
24 hours per day.95 These cells generally measure from 6x9 to 8x10 feet.96 Some solitary
confinement cells have bars, but most have solid metal doors, and many cells do not have
any windows.97 The cells are usually stripped bare.98 Some cells have showers, but the
individuals in cells without showers are taken in shackles to shower two or three times
per week.99 They may also be escorted to a yard, either walled or fenced in, to exercise
for an hour per day on weekdays.100
Individuals in solitary confinement have almost no contact with other humans,
and they usually only see guards when their meals are delivered on a food tray slipped
through a small opening in their cell door.101 The lights may be kept on for 24 hours per
day, making it difficult for individuals in isolation to know what time of day it is.102
Individuals in isolation are denied access to work and rehabilitative programs and face
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Casella, supra note 87 at 6.
Sarah Hockenberry & Anthony Sladky, Juvenile Residential Facility Census, 2016: Selected Findings,
U.S. Department of Justice, 4 (2018).
95
Casella, supra note 87 at 7.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Johnson, supra note 65 at 705.
99
Casella, supra note 87 at 7.
100
Id.
101
Bassett, supra note 89 at 408.
102
Id.
94
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severe restrictions on reading, craft, and hobby materials.103 According to data collected
by the Bureau of Prisons in 2012, the average duration of time spent in solitary
confinement, generally, is 223 days or over 7 months.104

Effects of Solitary Confinement
Research on the effects of solitary confinement on incarcerated juveniles is
limited.105 However, the existing studies have found that juvenile solitary confinement is
correlated with high rates of suicide, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression,
and future criminal activity.106 Additionally, the harmful impact of the practice on adult
prisoners has been well established in scholarly literature.107 It is important to note that
although there is a lack of data on incarcerated juveniles, the scope of the problem for
constitutional purposes is irrelevant. Whether the practice is imposed on one juvenile or
many, the United States Constitution does not allow an Eighth Amendment violation.
Solitary confinement imposes severe psychological effects on incarcerated
juveniles. A 2003 meta-analysis concluded that there was not a single published study of
solitary confinement lasting for more than ten days that failed to result in negative
psychological effects.108 Inmates who have spent extended time in solitary confinement
reported experiencing hypersensitivity to stimuli, confusion, memory loss, irritability,
and anger.109 Many inmates who have spent time in solitary confinement fall victim to

103

Id. at 409.
Id.
105
Birckhead, supra note 83, at 10.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 11.
108
Id. at 11-12.
109
Id. at 12.
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Secure Housing Unit (SHU) Syndrome, in which the symptoms include appetite and
sleep disturbances, anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, paranoia, hallucinations, selfmutilation, insomnia, hypersensitivity, ruminations, cognitive dysfunction, irritability,
and suicidal ideation and behavior.110 These symptoms may become irreversible beyond
15 days spent in solitary confinement.111 The psychological effects caused by long
periods of isolation often increase a juvenile’s risk of becoming acutely psychotic and
acutely suicidal.112 In fact, more than half of the suicides committed by incarcerated
juveniles occurred while the juvenile was in isolation. 113
In addition to the negative psychological effects imposed on juvenile offenders
through the use of solitary confinement, the practice also imposes negative physical
effects. Given that juveniles in solitary confinement are typically only allowed one hour
per day of exercise, they are deprived of necessary physical activity, which results in a
loss of aerobic and anaerobic fitness.114 Due to the nutritionally inadequate meals served
to those in solitary confinement, juveniles also experience chronic hunger, stunted
growth, hair loss, and weight loss.115 Additionally, young females often suffer from
amenorrhea, or a loss of menstruation, resulting from the inadequate nutrition as well as
stress and trauma.116
On top of the negative psychological and physical effects that solitary
confinement imposes on juvenile offenders, these youth also experience negative social
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Bassett, supra note 89, at 420.
Id.
112
Coler, supra note 86, at 104.
113
Brielle Basso, Solitary Confinement Reform Act: A Blueprint for Restricted Use of Solitary Confinement
of Juveniles Across the States, 48 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1601, 1606 (2018).
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Birckhead, supra note 83, at 14.
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Id.
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Id.
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consequences from the practice. Due to the complete lack of control that offenders have
over every aspect of their daily lives in solitary confinement, many of these offenders
gradually lose their ability to initiate or control their own behavior or to organize their
lives.117 Additionally, juveniles in solitary confinement are denied contact with family
members as well as any access to education, vocational training, and other forms of
rehabilitation.118 The denial of these basic needs decreases the chances that they will be
able to successfully reintegrate into the community when they are released from
detention.119 This social isolation is also linked to the experience of social pain.120 Social
pain entails the painful feelings that follow social rejection or social loss and can have an
adverse impact on a juvenile’s physical and mental health and psychological wellbeing.121
It is worth emphasizing that juveniles are already psychologically compromised
when compared to adults.122 Juveniles often enter the juvenile justice system with a prior
history of trauma and victimization.123 Disproportionate numbers of these juvenile
offenders also have special needs.124 Additionally, rates of mental health disorders are
higher among this group and the effects of solitary confinement can exacerbate
preexisting mental illness and increase the likelihood of subsequent drug abuse.125 The
harm inflicted on juveniles through the use of solitary confinement is very different and
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Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 16.
119
Id.
120
Federica Coppola, The Brain in Solitude: An (Other) Eighth Amendment Challenge to Solitary
Confinement, 7 J. Law Biosci. 184, 196 (2019).
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Id.
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Birckhead, supra note 83, at 13.
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Id. at 15.
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Id.
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more severe than the harm inflicted on adults because of its irreparability.126 Once the
developmental period for a juvenile has passed, the brain cannot go back and
redevelop.127 The effects of solitary confinement on incarcerated youth are conceivably
permanent.128

126

Coler, supra note 86, at 103.
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128
Id.
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CHAPTER 4
CONSTITUTIONAL REASONING

In order to determine whether juvenile solitary confinement violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the practice can be
considered in light of the framework used in Graham v. Florida. In that case, decided in
2010, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Constitution permits a
juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
nonhomicide crime.129 This issue was one the Court had not previously considered: a
categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence, meaning that the sentencing practice
itself was at issue as it applied to an entire class of offenders who had committed a range
of various crimes.130 It is important to note that the use of Graham in this analysis is not
intended to compare different types of punishment. Instead, this case is used as an
analytical tool to provide the Court’s most recent criteria for considering whether this is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The Evolving Standards of Decency
In cases considering the adoption of categorical bans, the Court has taken a twostep approach.131 First, the Court considers objective indicators of society’s standards, as
they are demonstrated in legislative enactments and state practice, to determine whether a
national consensus against the sentencing practice exists.132 In this step of the analysis,
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the Court focuses on the evolving standards of decency when considering the punishment
in question. National consensus is important, the Court has stated, because “in
a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people.”133 A national consensus analysis is very
demonstrative of how society feels about a certain punishment being imposed.
In Graham, the Court found that six jurisdictions did not allow life without parole
sentences for any juvenile offenders and seven jurisdictions only permitted life without
parole for juvenile offenders who committed homicide.134 Additionally, it found that 37
states, as well as the District of Columbia, permitted sentences of life without parole for a
juvenile nonhomicide offender only in some circumstances.135 However, it found that
federal law did allow for the possibility of life without parole for offenders as young as
thirteen.136
Despite this final finding, the Graham Court held that a consensus against the
sentencing practice existed.137 It stated that “the evidence of consensus is not undermined
by the fact that many jurisdictions do not prohibit life without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders.”138 It is instead actual sentencing practices that are a part of the
Court’s inquiry into consensus.139 Thus, even if a jurisdiction does not prohibit a certain
sentencing practice, it is the frequency of the use of the practice that is important in the
Court’s inquiry. In Graham, the Court found that there were only 109 juvenile offenders

133

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972).
Graham, 560 U.S. 48 at 62.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 66.
139
Id. at 62.
134

21

serving sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses nationwide.140
Therefore, the Court held that a consensus against the sentence in question existed.141
However, it must be noted that this determination was not uncontroversial. In
Justice Samuel Alito’s dissenting opinion, he stated that “the Framers did not provide for
the constitutionality of a particular type of punishment to turn on a ‘snapshot of American
public opinion’ taken at the moment a case is decided.”142 He also believed that the
American people would be surprised at the news of this evolution because Congress, the
District of Columbia, and 37 states had allowed judges and juries to consider the
sentencing practice in juvenile nonhomicide cases, with those judges and juries using the
punishment in the very worst cases it encountered.143
Although the national consensus inquiry was controversial in Graham, this step in
the analysis remains binding precedent. Thus, an inquiry into society’s standards in
regards to the practice of juvenile solitary confinement is necessary. “A nationwide shift
toward abolishing solitary confinement for juveniles … began to take shape in 2016 after
former President Barack Obama banned the practice in federal prisons.”144 In the months
following, Colorado and California both legislatively banned the use of punitive solitary
confinement for juveniles for periods longer than four hours.145 In addition, New York,
Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and West
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Virginia have passed laws that ban or limit solitary confinement for juveniles.146 Also,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Virginia have considered, but not
passed, legislation to limit the use of solitary confinement.147
In addition to the state legislation prohibiting or restricting solitary confinement,
there has also been movement on the federal level. In December of 2018, Congress
passed the First Step Act (FSA) and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
(JJDPA).148 The First Step Act prohibits federal juvenile facilities from using solitary
confinement as punishment, and only permits the use of solitary when youth behavior
poses a risk of immediate physical harm and cannot otherwise be deescalated.149 Under
this act, youth must be released as soon as they are calm, and they cannot be held in
solitary confinement for more than three hours.150 The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act requires states to provide data on restraint and isolation.151 This act also
requires states to describe their strategies to reduce isolation and provides federal training
to reduce isolation.152 Additionally, since October of 2015, several bills have been
proposed to Congress to reform juvenile solitary confinement standards.153
If the Graham Court held that a consensus against life without parole sentences
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders existed, a consensus against juvenile solitary
confinement must also exist. Not only are the number of states who have limited or
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banned the use of solitary confinement on juvenile offenders similar to the trends
displayed in Graham, but the former President of the United States banned the practice in
federal prisons in 2016. Additionally, there has been legislative movement at the federal
level, attempting to place limits on the practice. This federal movement away from the
practice, which was not present in Graham, as well as the many states’ bans or limits on
the practice clearly demonstrates that a consensus against the practice of juvenile solitary
confinement exists.
At the end of its opinion, the Graham Court added that there is support in its
conclusion in the fact that the sentencing practice is rejected all over the world.154 It
stated that the judgments of other nations and the international community are not
definitive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but that the attitude of
international opinions regarding the acceptability of a particular punishment is not
irrelevant.155 The Court found that only eleven nations authorized life without parole for
juvenile offenders under any circumstances, and that only two of them, the United States
and Israel, ever imposed the punishment in practice.156 The State’s amici stressed that no
international legal agreement that was binding on the United States prohibited life
without parole for juvenile offenders and urged the Court to ignore the international
consensus.157 However, the Court stated that the question is not whether international law
prohibits the United States from imposing the sentence, but whether the sentence is cruel
and unusual.158 The overwhelming weight of international opinion against the sentencing
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practice, the Court stated, “provides respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.”159
Similarly, in regards to juvenile solitary confinement, the international opinion
against the practice for all offenders provides confirmation in the conclusion that it
violates the Eighth Amendment. First, there is considerable agreement by the
international community that confinement can be a form of torture when it results in
severe harm, even in relatively short amounts of time.160 In fact, the United Nations has
recommended that solitary confinement be abolished altogether.161 In 1955, the United
Nations implemented international rules for prison operations globally, by adopting the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.162 While the United States
incorporated these rules seven years later, they are not followed to the same degree when
compared to the international community.163 Additionally, in most countries, the practice
of solitary confinement for all offenders has been largely discontinued.164 A notable
example of the international rejection of the practice can be found in Ireland, which
refused to extradite an individual to the United States in fear that he might be placed in a
solitary confinement cell in Colorado, which would violate Irish law.165
Like the sentencing practice at issue in Graham, solitary confinement has been
discontinued in most countries for all offenders, including adults. Additionally,
distinguishable from Graham, the United States is bound by an international legal

159

Id.
Andrew L. Hanna, Series on Solitary Confinement & The Eighth Amendment: Article III of III: Solitary
Confinement as Per Se Unconstitutional, 21 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 5 (May 2019).
161
Id. at 6.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 7.
160

25

agreement, which states that “punishment by placing in a dark cell, and all cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishments shall be completely prohibited as punishments for
disciplinary offences.”166 Thus, the overwhelming weight of international opinion against
the practice of solitary confinement for all offenders provides significant confirmation in
the conclusion that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment when imposed on
juveniles.

Proportionality
The Graham Court stated that although community consensus is entitled to great
weight, it is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.167
Instead, in accordance with the constitutional design, interpreting the Eighth Amendment
remains the Court’s responsibility.168 The second step in the Court’s two-step inquiry of
adopting categorical rules is guided by the standards elaborated by precedent and by the
Court’s own interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and
purpose.169 This part of the analysis is focused on the proportionality of the punishment
in question. In this step of the inquiry, the Court must exercise its own independent
judgment to determine whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.170
This exercise of independent judgment requires the Court to consider “the culpability of
the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity
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of the punishment in question.”171 Additionally, the Court considers whether the
sentencing practice at issue serves legitimate penological goals.172
In Graham, the Court examined the precedent set in Roper v. Simmons in its
consideration of the culpability of the offenders.173 The Roper Court established, and the
Graham Court reaffirmed, that juveniles have lessened culpability due to their lack of
maturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, vulnerability, susceptibility to negative
influences, and malleable characters.174 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court added that youth
is more than just a chronological fact.175 It is also a time of “immaturity, irresponsibility,
impetuousness, and recklessness.”176 Youth is, the Miller Court stated, “a moment and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage.”177
Additionally, the Graham Court reaffirmed that these characteristics make it
“difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption.”178 The Graham Court also found that developments in
brain science and psychology continue to show foundational differences between the
minds of adults and juveniles.179 These findings apply to equal force to juveniles in
solitary confinement, who only have as much culpability as the juveniles described in
Graham.
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In consideration of the severity of the punishment in question, the Graham Court
compared a life without parole sentence to a death sentence.180 It stated that a death
sentence is unique due to its severity and irrevocability, but that life without parole
sentences share some characteristics with death sentences.181 The Court stated that a life
without parole sentence, like a death sentence, deprives the offender of the most basic
liberties without hope of restoration.182 Additionally, it explained that a life without
parole sentence is especially harsh when imposed on a juvenile because a juvenile
offender will serve more years than that of an adult.183 The Court stated that the
punishment of life without parole, when simultaneously imposed on an adult and a
juvenile, is the same in name only.184
Similarly, juveniles in solitary confinement are deprived of basic liberties and
needs, leading to permanent physical, psychological, and social consequences.
Additionally, the harm inflicted on juveniles in solitary confinement is especially harsh
and irreparable because once the developmental period for a juvenile has passed, the
brain cannot go back and redevelop. Therefore, like the comparison made in Graham, the
practice of solitary confinement, when imposed on an adult and a juvenile, is the same in
name only.
Regarding penological goals, the Graham Court stated that “a sentence lacking
any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”185
The Miller Court added that “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological
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justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they
commit terrible crimes.”186 For this part of the inquiry, the Graham Court examined each
legitimate penological goal including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation, in light of the sentence of life without the possibility of parole.187 It held
that none of these goals of penal sanctions provided an adequate justification for the
punishment.188
First, the Court examined retribution and stated that it could not justify this
sentence because the retribution rationale is directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal offender, and juvenile offenders have diminished moral culpability.189
Similarly, retribution cannot justify the imposition of juvenile solitary confinement.
Although juveniles can be placed in solitary confinement for a variety of reasons, the
practice is often imposed for very minor violations. Juveniles can be placed in solitary
confinement for as long as 25 days for conduct as minimal as being in someone else’s
cell, not making their bed, littering, talking back, or wasting food.190 Additionally, the
practice is often imposed for the supposed protection of actual or perceived LGBTQ
inmates and mentally-ill or developmentally disabled inmates.191 As stated in Graham,
juveniles already have a diminished moral culpability.192 In addition, solitary
confinement imposes long-lasting, and sometimes permanent, physiological, mental, and
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physical damage on juveniles.193 There may be cases in which a juvenile is placed in
solitary confinement because they are considered to be a risk to themselves or to others.
However, the risk of negative effects is still too high to justify the practice. Due to the
reasons juveniles are placed in solitary confinement and the serious negative effects
imposed by the practice, it is a disproportionate punishment and is therefore not effective
in achieving the penological goal of retribution.
The Graham Court also stated that incapacitation did not justify the life without
parole sentence because that justification would require the sentencer to make a judgment
that the juvenile is incorrigible.194 This, the Court explained, is a questionable judgment
because even expert psychologists have difficulty differentiating between the juvenile
whose crime reflects immaturity, and “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”195 It could be argued that juvenile solitary confinement meets the
penological goal of incapacitation, as it completely removes the juvenile from all contact
with the general prison population. However, the risk of the negative effects imposed by
the practice is too high to use incapacitation as a justification for juvenile solitary
confinement. Instead of simply removing the juvenile from the general prison population,
this practice is the complete isolation and sensory deprivation of an individual, leading to
severe consequences that cannot be justified by the goal of incapacitation.196
The Graham Court stated that it could not justify the sentence as a form of
deterrence because, as stated in Roper, “the same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to
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deterrence.”197 The Graham Court stated that since juveniles have a “lack of maturity and
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” which “often result[s] in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions, they are less likely to take a possible punishment into
consideration when making decisions.”198 Similarly, juvenile solitary confinement cannot
be justified as a form of deterrence because the Graham reasoning applies with equal
force to this practice. As previously stated, juveniles are already psychologically
compromised when entering the juvenile justice system.199 Disproportionate numbers of
juvenile offenders enter the system with a prior history of trauma and victimization and
have special needs.200 Additionally, rates of mental health disorders are higher among this
group and the effects of solitary confinement can exacerbate preexisting mental illness
and increase the likelihood of subsequent drug abuse.201 Therefore, not only do the
underlying reasons juveniles are placed into solitary confinement make them less
susceptible to deterrence, placing them in isolation will only exacerbate those issues.
Additionally, there is evidence that prisoners who were confined in solitary
actually fare worse than those in the general prison population.202 A study conducted by
Daniel Mears and William Bales in 2009 compared the recidivism rates of individuals
who had been held in solitary confinement to those who had been held in the general
prison population.203 These researchers controlled for the number of times an inmate had
previously been imprisoned, the number of prior convictions for violent felony crimes,
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the number of disciplinary infractions that resulted from violent acts during the inmate’s
release commitment, and the number of disciplinary infractions received as a result of
defiant behavior.204 These control variables, which have been found to be important
predictors of post-prison offending, were used to increase the researchers’ confidence that
the estimates of the effects were unbiased and that the results did not reflect inmates who
were already prone to recidivism.205 The results of the study revealed that “solitary
confinement was associated with a higher risk that formerly incarcerated individuals
would commit a violent crime after being released.”206 The reasons for the increased risk
of recidivism originate largely from the brain alterations that occur when an individual is
confined in solitary.207 This evidence confirms that solitary confinement does not satisfy
the penological goal of deterrence.
Finally, the Graham Court stated that rehabilitation did not justify the sentence
because defendants serving life sentences without the possibility of parole are often
denied access to rehabilitative services such as vocational training or treatment.208
Rehabilitation is not an adequate justification for juvenile solitary confinement either.
The negative effects of solitary confinement may seriously compromise an individual’s
social functioning, therefore making their social reintegration into the community more
difficult, or even impossible in some cases.209 Thus, not only does solitary confinement
fail to satisfy the penological goal of rehabilitation, the practice actually opposes the
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values and aims of the penological goal altogether. Due to a juvenile’s malleability and
increased capacity for change, rehabilitation is the primary penological goal for youthful
offenders. Therefore, the question of whether juvenile solitary confinement has any
rehabilitative potential needs to be given heavier weight than any other penological goal.
The Graham Court ultimately held that the limited culpability of juvenile
nonhomicide offenders, the severity of life without parole sentences, and the
determination that penological theory is not adequate to justify the sentence all led to the
conclusion that the sentencing practice was cruel and unusual.210 Additionally, the
overwhelming international opinion against the practice significantly confirmed its
holding.211 Similarly, the limited culpability of juveniles, the severity of the practice of
juvenile solitary confinement, and the determination that penological theory does not
adequately justify the practice all leads to the conclusion that the practice is cruel and
unusual, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The overwhelming international opinion
against this practice for offenders of all ages further confirms this determination.
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CHAPTER 5
REMEDY

Roper v. Simmons
Now that it has been established that juvenile solitary confinement violates the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, a categorical ban must
be considered. In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court considered whether a categorical
ban on the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen
was necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.212 It followed the holding of Thompson
v. Oklahoma, which recognized the implications of the characteristics of juveniles under
sixteen and relied on them to categorically ban the imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles below that age.213 The Thompson Court recognized that less education, less
intelligence, and less experience all leave a juvenile less able to evaluate the
consequences of their actions, while also making them more inclined to be motivated by
emotion or peer pressure.214 It also stated, as previously discussed, that the reasons that
juveniles are not trusted with the responsibilities and privileges of an adult also explains
why their conduct is not as blameworthy as that of an adult.215
The Roper Court concluded that the same reasoning applied to all juvenile
offenders under the age of eighteen.216 Petitioner and his amici in that case asserted that
even assuming that the observations the Court made about juveniles’ diminished
culpability is true, jurors should be allowed to consider mitigating arguments related to
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youth on a case-by-case basis, and, in some cases, impose the death penalty if justified.217
Petitioner also maintained that it is arbitrary and unnecessary to adopt a categorial rule
banning imposition of the death penalty on offenders under eighteen years of age.218 The
Court disagreed and stated that the differences between juveniles and adults are too
distinct and well understood to risk allowing a juvenile to receive the death penalty
despite their insufficient culpability.219 It admitted that there may be a rare case in which
a juvenile offender has reached sufficient psychological maturity and demonstrates
sufficient depravity to justify a sentence of death.220 However, the age of eighteen, the
Court held, is the point where society draws a line between childhood and adulthood for
many purposes, and it is the line at which death eligibility also ought to be drawn.221
Similarly, the differences between juveniles and adults are too distinct and well
understood to risk allowing a juvenile to be placed in solitary confinement despite their
insufficient culpability. As the Roper Court admitted, there may be a rare case in which
placing a juvenile in solitary confinement is justified. However, a line must be drawn to
ensure juveniles are not receiving a punishment that they are not sufficiently culpable for.
The age of eighteen is where society continues to draw a line between juveniles and
adults, so it is the line at which the use of solitary confinement must also be drawn.
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Graham v. Florida
Although the Roper reasoning clearly demonstrates that a categorical ban is a
fitting remedy for this issue, a categorical ban on juvenile solitary confinement can also
be considered in light of the reasoning in Graham. After reaching its holding that the
Eighth Amendment did not allow the sentence of life without parole for a juvenile
offender who did not commit homicide, the Graham Court also considered a categorical
ban.222 It stated that categorical rules tend to be imperfect, but that one was necessary in
that case.223 A categorical rule, the Court stated, gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders
the opportunity to demonstrate maturity and reform.224 It reasoned that a juvenile should
not be deprived of the chance to “achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of
human worth and potential.”225 The Court added that the sentence in question “gives no
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society,
[and] no hope.”226
Due to the irreversible psychological, physical, and social harm imposed on
juveniles who spend time in solitary confinement, they do not have a complete
opportunity for fulfillment or reconciliation with society either. As previously stated, the
complete lack of control that offenders have over every aspect of their daily lives in
solitary confinement leads many of these offenders to gradually lose their ability to
initiate or control their own behavior or to organize their lives.227 This decreases the
chances that they will be able to successfully reintegrate into the community when they
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are released from detention.228 These consequences do not allow juveniles to achieve
maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and potential, all of which the
Graham Court stated they should not be deprived of. While juveniles who spend time in
solitary confinement have an opportunity to demonstrate maturity and reform, unlike the
issue in Graham, the negative effects make it extremely difficult for them to mature or
reform while in isolation.
Additionally, the Graham Court stated that, in some prisons, it is the policy to
withhold education, counseling, and rehabilitation programs for offenders who are not
eligible for parole consideration.229 Thus, a categorical rule against life without parole for
juvenile offenders avoids the contradictory consequence in which the deficient maturity
that led to the offender’s crime is reinforced by their prison term.230 The Court held that
the State had denied Graham any opportunity “to later demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin
society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed when he was a child in
the eyes of the law.”231 This, the Court held, is not permitted by the Eighth
Amendment.232
Like offenders who are not eligible for parole consideration, juveniles in solitary
confinement are denied access to education, vocational training, and other forms of
rehabilitation.233 Thus, by adopting a categorical rule against juvenile solitary
confinement, the consequence of deficient maturity that led to the offender’s crime being
reinforced by their prison term can be avoided. Additionally, as previously stated,
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juveniles who are placed in solitary confinement will be less likely to successfully rejoin
society.234 Denying a juvenile an opportunity to later demonstrate that they are able to
successfully reintegrate into the community based on an offense committed when they
were a child in the eyes of the law is not permitted by the Eighth Amendment. As the
Graham Court stated, categorical bans are not perfect, but one is absolutely necessary
here.
It is worth noting here that this categorical ban must be applied to all juvenile
offenders, no matter the facility they are housed in. It is the differences between juveniles
and adults, not the difference between juvenile and adult facilities, that leads to this
Eighth Amendment violation. Thus, the categorical ban must be applied by the age of the
offender, not the place they are serving time in. Solitary confinement must not be
imposed on any juveniles under the age of eighteen, even if they are housed in adult
correctional facilities.
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CHAPTER 6
COUNTERARGUMENTS

Is Juvenile Solitary Confinement Really Punitive?
It could be argued that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to juvenile solitary
confinement because the practice is not punitive. Although the Court has never explicitly
ruled on the issue of the use of solitary confinement as punitive versus regulatory, it has
implied that the practice is a form of punishment. In the 1890 case of In Re Medley, the
Supreme Court held that solitary confinement is a separate punishment, in addition to the
punishment for the original crime, and is subject to constitutional restraints.235 In the
decades since that decision, however, the Court has seemingly ignored that holding,
leaving the question of whether solitary confinement is punitive open.236 In 2018, in a
denial of certiorari of Apodaca v. Raemisch, Justice Sonya Sotomayor wrote a statement
on this issue.237 Referring to solitary confinement, she stated that a punishment does not
need to “leave physical scars to be cruel and unusual.”238 She also asserted that courts and
correctional officials must “remain alert to the clear constitutional problems raised by
keeping prisoners in ‘near-total’ isolation from the living world in what comes perilously
close to a penal tomb.”239 Thus, although the Court has not explicitly ruled on the issue of
whether solitary confinement is punitive, it seems that it does view the practice as such.
Even so, the issue has not been given a clear answer by the Court and requires additional
analysis.
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Although the imposition of punishment has a unique legal significance in the
United States, the Supreme Court has never provided a precise definition of
punishment.240 However, by examining Supreme Court precedent, it is possible to make
observations about how the Court determines what sanctions qualify as punitive.241 In
2003, in the case of Smith v. Doe, the Court considered whether the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act was punitive.242 The Court held that if the intention of the legislature is
to impose punishment, the sanction is clearly punitive.243 However, it stated that if the
intention is to enact a regulatory scheme that is nonpunitive, it requires further
examination to determine whether the scheme is so punitive, either in its effects or
purpose, as to negate the government’s intention to deem it nonpunitive.244
The government generally justifies the use of solitary confinement on two
grounds: administrative or regulatory solitary confinement and disciplinary solitary
confinement.245 Administrative solitary confinement is used to manage the safety and
security of the facility and may be used when an inmate is waiting to be transferred, must
be protected from other inmates,246 is awaiting a hearing, is under investigation for a
violation of a prison regulation, or has been classified as a risk to other inmates or
staff.247 Disciplinary solitary confinement is used in correctional facilities for punitive
purposes and may be used as punishment for prohibited conduct.248
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Thus, according to the holding of Smith, disciplinary juvenile solitary
confinement is indeed punitive, and falls within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.
Administrative or regulatory juvenile solitary confinement, however, requires further
examination to determine whether the practice is so punitive that it negates the
government’s intention to deem it nonpunitive. The first step in this inquiry, according to
the Smith Court, is to determine whether the sanction was established with the intent of
creating a nonpunitive scheme.249 Administrative or regulatory juvenile solitary
confinement was established with the intent to manage the safety and security of the
facility and of the offenders. Therefore, this form of the practice was clearly established
with the intent of creating a nonpunitive scheme. This finding, however, is not
dispositive.
The second step in this inquiry is to analyze the effects of the sanction.250 For this
part of the analysis, the Smith Court referred to seven factors noted in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez as a framework.251 Since these factors were designed to apply in a
variety of constitutional contexts, the Court stated that they are “neither exhaustive nor
dispositive, but are useful guideposts.”252 The factors most relevant to this analysis are
whether the sanction has been historically regarded as punishment, whether it involves an
affirmative disability or restraint, whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether it has a rational
connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and whether it appears excessive in respect to this
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alternative purpose.253 The remaining factor, whether the sanction comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, is of little weight in this inquiry.254
A historical analysis can be useful in this inquiry, according to the Smith Court,
because when deciding to punish an individual, one is likely to select a means of
punishment that is deemed punitive in tradition so that the public will recognize it as
punishment.255 It its analysis, the Smith Court held that the sanction did not involve
traditional means of punishing because “sex offender registration and notification statutes
are of fairly recent origin.”256 Distinguishably, solitary confinement has been used in
penal institutions in the United States since the 1800s.257 As previously discussed,
solitary confinement was originally intended to force the prisoner to reflect upon his
crime, read the Bible, and repent.258 Thus, unlike the case of Smith, juvenile solitary
confinement does involve traditional means of punishing.
In considering whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
the Smith Court inquired how the effects of the Act were felt by those subjected to it.259 If
the disability or restraint is indirect and minor, the Court stated, its effects are unlikely to
be punitive.260 In that case, the Court held that the Act imposed no physical restraint, and
thus did not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the standard affirmative
disability or restraint.261 Distinguishably, juvenile solitary confinement does involve an
affirmative restraint that entirely resembles the punishment of imprisonment. As
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previously discussed, solitary confinement is the practice of isolating people in closed
cells for 22 to 24 hours per day in cells that generally measure from 6x9 to 8x10 feet.262
Thus, juvenile solitary confinement, unlike the Act in question in Smith, clearly involves
an affirmative disability or restraint.
In its inquiry into whether the Act promoted the traditional aims of punishment,
the Smith Court stated that the Act was not promoting deterrence because that State only
conceded that the statute might deter future crime, and any number of governmental
programs might deter crime without imposing punishment.263 Additionally, it stated that
the Act was not retributive in nature because the Act was based on the extent of the
wrongdoing, not the extent of the risk posed.264 Similarly, regulatory juvenile solitary
confinement is not an attempt to promote deterrence. However, the practice is retributive
in nature. Regulatory juvenile solitary confinement is based on the extent of the risk
posed, unlike the Act in Smith. One of the main purposes of the practice is to isolate an
inmate who has been classified as a risk to other inmates or staff. Thus, regulatory
juvenile solitary confinement attempts to promote one of the traditional aims of
punishment.
The factor considering whether the behavior to which a sanction applies is already
a crime did not apply to the Smith case, and was therefore not considered.265 Applying
this factor to juvenile solitary confinement, or any cases involving prisoner maltreatment,
is an ambiguous task because these cases might well be viewed as sanctions imposed for
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violations of guards’ orders instead of legal rules.266 However, this interpretation is
neither necessary nor accurate.267 These sanctions should be viewed as not only imposed
for violations of rules or orders, but as an aspect of the initial sanction imposed for the
prisoner’s original offense.268 This interpretation is proper in all respects because when a
person is sentenced to prison, they are not sentenced to confinement in the abstract.269
They are sentenced to confinement that takes place under certain conditions.270 Thus,
juvenile solitary confinement is a sanction imposed as an aspect of the juvenile’s initial
offense, which was indeed a crime.
In considering whether the Act had a rational connection to a nonpunitive
purpose, the Smith Court held that it had a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public
safety.271 Similarly, regulatory juvenile solitary confinement has a legitimate nonpunitive
purpose of safety and security of correctional facilities and inmates. In considering
whether the Act appeared excessive in respect to this alternative purpose, the Smith Court
stated that it was not its duty, in this inquiry, to decide whether the legislature had made
the best possible choice to address the problem it attempted to remedy.272 The question in
this inquiry, it stated, “is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of
the nonpunitive objective.”273 The Court held that the Act was reasonable in light of the
regulative purpose of public safety because the risk of recidivism that sex offenders pose
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is frightening and high.274 Thus, it held that the Act was not excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose. Unlike the Act in Smith, juvenile solitary confinement is not
reasonable in light of the regulatory purpose of facility and inmate safety and security.
Isolating inmates in closed cells for 22 to 24 hours per day with virtually no human
contact is clearly not a reasonable regulatory means to achieve the purpose of safety and
security in correctional facilities.275 Although the facility has a clear duty to protect other
inmates in the facility, as previous discussed, juveniles are often placed into solitary
confinement for minor, nonviolent violations. Therefore, although there is a rational
alternative purpose for juvenile solitary confinement, the sanction is clearly excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose.
The Smith Court ultimately held, based on the factors laid out in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act was nonpunitive.276
Thus, regulatory juvenile solitary confinement must be punitive. There are only two
similarities between the findings of these two sanctions. First, they both were established
with the intent of creating a nonpunitive scheme, which is not dispositive. Second, they
both have a legitimate nonpunitive purpose. However, the sanction in question here is
excessive in relation to that alternative purpose. Therefore, regulatory juvenile solitary
confinement is clearly so punitive, in its effects and purpose, as to negate the
government’s intention to deem it nonpunitive.
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Do the Qualities of Youth Disappear at Age Eighteen?
It could be argued that a categorical ban on juvenile solitary confinement is not
effective because the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not necessarily
disappear when one turns eighteen.277 The Roper Court stated that this objection is
always raised against categorical rules.278 However, it responded to this objection by
stating that just as some juveniles over the age of eighteen still encompass the qualities of
youth, some under the age of eighteen have already reached a level of maturity that some
adults never will.279 As previously stated, the characteristics of youth make it “difficult
even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime
reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”280 A rare case may arise in which a juvenile is sufficiently
culpable to cope with the imposition of solitary confinement. However, as previously
stated, the differences between juveniles and adults are too distinct and well understood
to risk allowing a juvenile to encounter the imposition of solitary confinement despite
their insufficient culpability.281 A line must be drawn, and given that the age of eighteen
is the point in which society draws the line between childhood and adulthood for various
purposes, it is the age at which the line for solitary confinement eligibility also ought to
rest.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

To sum up, juveniles are different. They are different in their vulnerability, their
lack of maturity, and their diminished culpability, and they must be constitutionally
treated as such. The punishment is different. Solitary confinement imposes severe
psychological, physical, social, and developmental harm. This harm, when inflicted on
juveniles, is very different and more severe than the harm inflicted on adults because of
its irreparability. When imposed on juveniles, these effects are conceivably permanent.
An application of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to the imposition of solitary
confinement on juvenile offenders clearly illustrates that the Supreme Court should
declare the practice unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
practice fails to satisfy the two-step inquiry in Graham. Given that the Eighth
Amendment does not allow for the imposition of solitary confinement on juveniles, the
appropriate remedy is a categorical ban. An application of the practice to the precedential
cases of Roper and Graham clearly demonstrates the need for a categorical ban on the
imposition of solitary confinement for offenders under the age of eighteen.

Recommendations for Future Research
One of the greatest barriers to this research is the lack of available and current
data on juveniles in solitary confinement. There is a shortage of data on the prevalence of
juvenile solitary confinement use, as well as on the effects the practice imposes on
juveniles. Thus, future research should investigate the reasons for the lack of this data.
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Additionally, future research should consider ways to initiate and organize this data
collection.
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